Introduction

Now that the Democratic convention is over, we are now officially in the “final sprint” to Election Day. Primary season has nearly concluded (Alaska, Florida, and Wyoming held their primaries this past Tuesday), which means now that only five states have not yet held their primaries. Four of those five contests will be held in early September, while the Louisiana primary coincides with the Federal Election Day of November 5.

Now that we are in the “home stretch” and Labor Day just over a week away, what has been going on (from a polling perspective) with the Presidential race?

Presidential Polling

When discussing polling for the 2024 Presidential contest, there are two atmospheric challenges the party in power/its official nominee Kamala Harris faces: (1) while her approval ratings have improved since the Biden withdrawal from the race, they still remain “underwater” (her 45-48% approval/disapproval according to 538 remains unchanged since a week ago), and (2) persistent high disapproval (43-55% approval/disapproval according to a 7 day average of polls taken, which is unchanged since last week) of the Biden administration. Since Kamala Harris is Joe Biden’s Vice-President, that persistent disapproval remains a negative weight on her campaign, and President Biden’s opening night speech (although its delay until late in the night/past network “prime time” likely blunted any viewership impact) further reinforced that association in voters’ minds.

In the aftermath of the Biden withdrawal, the Harris campaign benefitted from a three-week honeymoon that involved both a smoothly executed rollout of her campaign and a leak-free Vice Presidential selection process. She has also received some incremental benefit (from a visual standpoint) from an error-free convention. While we won’t have complete polling data until next week, a 7 day average of national polling data as of this morning shows that since last week, a 1.4% lead for the Harris-Walz ticket a week ago has expanded to 2.3%.

From a numerical/trend perspective, that means that a 3.2% Trump poll lead five weeks ago has moved 5.5% “to the left” to a 2.3% poll deficit. And since polls conducted in the aftermath of the convention will be released next week, there may be some additional benefit to the Harris-Walz ticket. However, the author is stressing that any “Democratic bounce” will likely be minor because (1) existing polarization in the American electorate allows for little room for much partisan movement either way, and (2) political conventions aren’t news events like they once were, so they don’t have the “game changing” capability they once did.

Given these realities, the author still holds to a prediction made last week that the previously forecast 4-5% Harris lead before Labor Day will likely be in the 2-3% range now. Below is a representation of the weekly changes in the national poll averages over the last several months:

Weekly polling averages

When discussing the news value of polls taken at a national level, it’s important (in terms of putting national polling numbers in their proper context) to realize that the Electoral College (and not the national popular vote) actually elects a President. That technical distinction marginally benefit the Republicans. In other words, because of an inefficient vote distribution of Democratic and Republican votes across the 50 states, it’s possible for a Republican to be elected President without attaining a popular vote majority (or even a plurality), because California and New York have in recent election cycles generated larger Democratic vote margins than Florida and Texas have for Republicans. And while those large margins in California/New York run up the score from a national popular vote perspective, “running up the score” doesn’t get a Democratic candidate any closer to the needed 270 electoral votes.

National popular vote vs the Electoral College

To illustrate the disconnect between the Electoral College and the national popular vote, Joe Biden was elected in 2020 with a 4.5% popular vote margin (51.3-46.8%) over Donald Trump. He also “won” the Electoral College 303-235 using applicable numbers for the 2024 Presidential election (270 electoral votes are needed to win), Biden’s Electoral College victory was due to narrow victories in several states, like Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.

From that starting point of a 4.5% national popular vote win, we can assess the extent to which shifts in the national popular vote towards Trump could flip specific swing states, as national shifts can and will have an impact in both swing and non-swing states. To be conservative in his analysis, JMC is assuming that only half of a national popular vote shift (percentagewise) would occur in a swing state, since those states (which get an oversized amount of attention from either side) tend to be less elastic in their movement towards a candidate.

Still, even with this conservative analysis, any movement towards Trump relative to a 4.5% national popular vote deficit would “flip” states to Trump that narrowly voted for Biden in 2020. For example, even a Kamala Harris national popular vote win of 3.5% (a shift of only 1% towards Trump, in other words) would flip Arizona and Georgia, and those two flips alone would get Trump up to 262 electoral votes – 8 electoral votes shy of a victory. A Harris win of 2.5% (a 2% shift towards Trump relative to 2020) would also flip Wisconsin and get Trump to the necessary 270 electoral votes.

To translate that theory into “real world” terms, the last seven days of national polling show an average lead for Kamala Harris of 2.3% (she’s up 47.7-45.5% over Trump), which would translate to 272 electoral votes for Trump. In other words, a 2.3% Harris lead equals a 2.2% swing to Trump relative to his 2020 popular vote loss. A swing of that magnitude (even accounting for swing states’ being less elastic than the rest of the country) would flip Arizona, Georgia, and Wisconsin and give Trump the electoral votes he needs to win. Below is a representation of the electoral college impact of various national popular vote possibilities.

National popular vote shifts v the Electoral College

The early vote

While technically Election Day is November 5, an increasing number of voters are choosing to vote before that. Research done shows that 45% voted early in 2016, and that number surged to 69% in 2020. While the pandemic/mass adoption of mail voting certainly contributed to the increase in early voting in 2020, the reality is, Election Day voting has nevertheless become a thing of the past for an increasing number of people, which DOES impact the timing of when campaigns need to disseminate their messaging to voters.

In practical terms, “Election Day” actually begins when North Carolina sends out mail ballots on September 6. It then shifts into overdrive on September 20 when Minnesota, South Dakota, and Virginia become the first states to start in person early voting. More states will join in as we advance through the election calendar, and by October 8, states constituting a majority of the Electoral College will have their “Election Days” underway. Below is a calendar of the first month of early voting:

Early voting schedule (partial)

Conclusion

Even though the Republicans have not had a favorable last five weeks, existing polarization of the electorate, combined with scrutiny over the Harris/Walz ticket, will level the playing field. While Harris will likely get some residual benefit from the just concluded convention, candidate debates will likely have some impact as well, although it’s important to appreciate that the campaign clock is starting to tick: in 13 days, mail ballots go out in North Carolina, while in person early voting commences on September 20 in Minnesota, South Dakota, and Virginia.

What this means in practical terms is that the peak of campaign season (in terms of reaching the maximum number of movable voters) will be during the month of September, because states will be steadily ramping up their early voting throughout October, and by then, those who have voted become irrelevant to either campaign from a persuasion perspective.