Case Study
Background
In Fall 2009, East Baton Rouge Parish Mayor-President Kip Holden wanted to put a bond proposal, which involved a sales and property tax increase, on the ballot for the second time, as the tax proposal narrowly failed the first time it was placed on the ballot in November 2008 – on the same day that Baton Rougeans were voting for President, a U.S.Senate race, and a U.S. House race. There was massive institutional support for this measure; only the Baton Rouge Tea Party took the lead in opposing the tax proposal. JMC Enterprises was hired by the Baton Rouge Tea Party to provide (1) strategic/demographic consulting, (2) targeted voter files for canvassing, phone banking, and yard sign placement.
Our Approach
With a limited amount of time and resources, the Baton Rouge Tea Party’s challenge was mobilizing the maximum amount of favorable voters in a limited amount of time. As we researched a sample of tax elections held in East Baton Rouge Parish over the last decade, we discovered that Central and Zachary were the most anti-tax areas, so for those areas, a “likely voter” was broadly defined as anyone who had cast a ballot between 2004 and 2008. In Baker and Southeast Baton Rouge, a “likely voter” had voted in any one of the Congressional special elections held in the Spring of 2008 (primary, runoff, or general election). We also advised the group that neighborhoods off Highland and/or Perkins Road were swing precincts when it came to tax elections, and as such, they needed to be targeted as well.
Once a targeted voter file was run for them, as resources came available, we first did a “robocall” to ID as many favorable, unfavorable, and undecided voters from the most anti tax areas. This “robocall” also doubled as a poll, since the sample of voters chosen were chosen solely on the basis of those being likely to chronic voters. After the first robocall was performed, we then performed a second robocall to ID (1) those who didn’t pick up the phone the first night, and (2) poll the more pro tax areas to gauge the level of pro tax sentiment. When we discovered the strength of anti tax feelings in favorable precincts, and the corresponding weakness of pro tax sentiment in the less favorable precincts, we were then able to tailor the Election Day GOTV accordingly confident in the ultimate outcome.
Result
In the end, the tax failed 64-36%, aided partially by a turnout that was 9% higher in anti tax areas than in pro tax areas. This despite the fact that the Baton Rouge Tea Party was vastly outspent, was largely not present on the airwaves, and despite the fact that the pro tax faction had the support of most local political and business leaders.
